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Abstract
In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as
a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of problem we
consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable permits
market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the ambient
standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incentive to ensure
that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to achieve the
standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to distribute ef-
fectively this abatement level through the price of the permits which
rises with the exchange of the permits.
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11 Introduction
Nonpointsource pollution is characterized by the fact that individual emis-
sions cannot be controlled at a reasonable cost. Hence the failure of tradi-
tional economic instruments (taxes, standards, tradable permits markets)
to solve this type of problem. Indeed, one cannot differentiate the tax and
the standard according to the characteristics of each agent; furthermore
one cannot dissuade an agent from free-riding when a tradable permits
market is implemented because an agent’s individual contribution to am-
bient pollution is not identiﬁable. Consequently, the inobservability of in-
dividual performances in the case of nonpoint source pollution induced
the economists to consider instruments based on collective performance
(ambient pollution). However, the heterogeneity of the agents implied in
nonpoint source pollution deteriorates the effectiveness of ambient mech-
anisms as it poses the problem of the distribution of abatement levels be-
tween these agents.
To solve the problem of moral hazard resulting from nonpoint source pol-
lution, Meran and Schwalbe [3] and Segerson [5] propose a system of col-
lective incentives based on the difference between the level of ambient pol-
lution measured at a given site and a standard of ambient pollution ﬁxed
in advance. These ambient mechanisms were supported by several exper-
imental studies ([4], [7] and [1]) which showed the effectiveness of such
approaches to achieve the abatement goal.
However, the heterogeneity of the agents responsible for nonpoint source
pollution affects the economic effectiveness of this mechanism. Indeed, as
the regulator cannot know the individual abatement level that an agent
must support, he cannot achieve the abatement goal at a lower cost. One of
the possible solutions to control this type of asymmetry is the implemen-
tation of a decentralized economic instrument. Instead of seeking informa-
tion, one lets the farmer reveal it through the market of tradable permits.
The advantage of this solution, compared to a standard, appears when the
regulator does not have sufﬁcient information on individual emissions and
this cannot differentiate the standard according to each agent’s characteris-
tics. Inthiscase shesetsastandard ofambient pollutionand letsthemarket
2ﬁx the individual emissions levels. This corresponds to a transfer of strat-
egy from the regulator towards the polluters - a decentralized instrument.
In this article we design a tradable permits market associated to an ambi-
ent pollution based tax in the event of non-compliance to a pre-determined
standard. On the one hand, the role of the tax is to ensure that the agents
will provide the necessary collective abatement level to achieve the total
depollution goal. On the other hand, the market for tradable permits has
the role of effectively distributing this collective abatement level among the
agents. The permit price which emergesfrom the exchanges is the standard
of distribution of the abatement level.
Segerson and Wu [6] also used a nonpoint source pollution control instru-
ment associated to a threat if the abatement goal is not achieved. These
authors proposed a voluntary mechanism of nonpoint source pollution
abatement, however, if the abatement goal is not achieved then the reg-
ulator engages in costly information seeking about individual emissions.
In fact, Segersonand Wu [6], make the assumption that the damage caused
by pollution is higher than the cost of follow-up and control of the individ-
ual emissions. Contrary to Segerson and Wu [6], in this article we assume
that the cost of control and follow-up of the individual emissions is pro-
hibitively expensive and/or technically impossible to implement.
This article is organised as follows. In section 2, we solve the group moral
hazard issue which is a characteristic of nonpoint source pollution, by de-
termining the level of the ambient pollution based tax that agents will face
if the ambient pollution standard is not achieved. Then in section 3, we
solve the adverse selection problem by designing a tradable permits mar-
ket that induces the agents to reach the abatement goal effectively. Then in
section 4 we discuss the results and provide some concluding remarks.
2 Group moral hazard: Ambient pollution based tax
The fact that individual emissions are not observable while collective pol-
lution (ambient pollution) is, is a case of group moral hazard. Holmstr¨ om
[2] analysed group moral hazard in teams. However, the ﬁrst to have mo-
3bilized the collective mechanisms for the management of nonpoint source
pollution are Meran and Schwalbe [3] and Segerson[5]. These authors pro-
posed an incentive scheme of tax/subsidy based on the difference between
a level of ambient pollution observed at a given site and an ambient pol-
lution standard ﬁxed in advance. Several experimental studies showed the
effectiveness of such instruments to achieve a depollution goal ([4], [7] and
[1]). However, what comes out of these experimental studies it is that the
mechanism of ambient pollution based tax/subsidy may even induce the
agents to over-abate. In what follows we approach agricultural nonpoint
source pollution as a group moral hazard issue, and deﬁne an appropriate
ambient tax.
We consider a watershed where are located n agents whose individual
emissions cannot be observed by the regulator. Let Z be the total ambi-
ent pollution emitted by the agents and measured at the outset of the wa-
tershed. This ambient pollution is easily observable and measured by the
regulator. It originates exclusively from the activities of the agents located
in the watershed. Let gi(zi) the output function of the agent i and zi the
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out any pollution regulation policy, the abatement of the agent i is ai = 0.
In the pollution function that results in Zi(gi(z0
i ),0), with z0
i the amount of
pollutant input used by agent i before the policy regulation of pollution.
Inordertolimit pollution, theregulatorenforcesanambient pollutionstan-
dard ¯ Z, exogenous to the model. This standard can represent a health or
ecological standard. Once the standard is established, the regulator an-
nounces to the agents contributing to ambient pollution that if the standard
is exceeded they will all be taxed according to the difference between ob-
served ambient pollution Z and the ambient standard ¯ Z. The ambient tax





τ(Z − ¯ Z) if Z > ¯ Z,
0 otherwise
with τ the tax rate.
We assume that individual polluters are risk neutral and competitive in the
output market. Then at this stage, the individual program of an agent i is:
max
gi,zi,ai
πi = sgi(zi) − ci(gi(zi),ai) − τE[Z]
s is the output price, g is the production function, c is the cost function, a is
the abatement vector and E[Z] is the expected ambient pollution level.
The regulator seeks to deﬁne the tax rate τ such that all agents comply with
the ambient pollution standard. As described by Segerson [5] for a tax rate
equal to the marginal damage of the excess of ambient pollution each agent
will compliant and maximizes his proﬁt function without free-riding.
Although the procedure is not optimal, by imposing a tax rate higher than
the marginal abatement cost by any agent, the regulator is certain that she
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The equation (6) gives us the marginal abatement cost corresponding to
the shadow cost of the constraint of the scarcity of the resource (equation
1). However the equation 1 is a coupling constraint and the agent i only
knows his abatement costs and does not have any means of knowing the
shadow costs λ of the coupling constraint. So even if he wants to comply,
agent i does not know the abatement ai that he must provide. In order
to overcome this lack of information, the regulator implements a tradable
permits market. Indeed, this instrument has the potential to equalize the
marginal abatement cost with the price, inducing the agents to abate effec-
tively.
3 Adverse selection: Tradable permits market
As the group moral hazard issue is solved, we are interested in the distri-
bution of the abatement level between the agents, knowing that no agent
knows the marginal abatement costs of the other agents.
In the case of nonpoint source pollution, the information asymmetry be-
tween the regulator and the farmer is the main issue. One of the possible
solutions to control this type of pollution is the implementation of a decen-
tralized economic instrument. Instead of seeking information, one lets the
farmer reveal it through a tradable permits market. The advantage of this
solution compared to the standard is apparent when the regulator does not
have sufﬁcient information on maximum emissions for each agent. In this
case he sets a total standard of ambient pollution and lets the market ﬁx the
levels of individual emissions. This corresponds to a transfer of strategy
from the regulator towards the polluters.
Intheir initial version, it was proposedto introduce the permits via a mech-
anism of bidding. This implies a high initial cost for the agents. This cost
6can be reduced by proposing a free allowance to the agents. The regu-
lator sets a pollution standard and distributes the corresponding number
of permits. The agents exchange the permits between them. Those whose
marginal abatement cost is lowerthan the price of thepermits, forthe num-
ber of permits which were allocated to them, will sell their surplus to those
who have a deﬁcit of permits. A rule of allowance must however be de-
ﬁned. A majority of authors privilege the simplest rule of grand-fathering
where the allowance depends on historical levels of emissions. Several
studies showed that if the market is competitive, an effective equilibrium is
reached whatever the initial allowance [8]. Moreover, assuming that all the
agents minimize their costs, a well-deﬁned tradable permits market could
allocate the permits effectively, and imply compliance to the ambient pollu-
tion goal, in spite of an incomplete information structure about the various
control possibilities of the regulator [8].
In this article we propose a market associated to the ambient pollution
based tax described above.
Let x0




j = ¯ x, with, Z(¯ x,A) =
¯ Z. A is the collective abatement level that all agents have to provide to





i is the quantity of exchanged permits so that xe
i = x0
i − xu
i , with xu
i the





i < 0 the agent i is a buyer
If xe
i > 0 the agent i is a seller
The market is competitive and the permits price p is exogenous to agent i.
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− αi + βi + φ = 0 (13)















= p − αi + γ = 0 (15)
From equation 15 we deduce that:
αi = p + γ (16)










) + φ = p + γ (17)
As φ is the shadow cost of the scarcity of the permits and γ is the shadow












8The equations 18 and 6 give us:
λ = p (19)
This result gives a means for an agent to know the level of reduction that
he should achieve.
To summarize the mechanism, the regulator distributes pollution permits




j = ¯ x. She imposes thereafter a conditional
ambient pollution tax which depends on the level of ambient pollution Z.
If the ambient pollution standard ¯ Z is exceeded, then the regulator imple-
ments an ambient pollution based tax τ(Z − ¯ Z), with a rate tax τ equal to
the marginal damage. Otherwise the ambient pollution based tax is not ap-
plied. The agents prefer to exchange permits according to their abatement
cost and the price of permits. So they can observe a price which leads their
abatement.
Thus a tradable permits market coupled to an ambient pollution based tax
allows to an agent to effectively abate through the permit’s price and gives
an incentive that avoids any free-riding behaviour.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
This article deals with the management of nonpoint source pollution as
a group moral hazard issue. In order to solve this problem we designed a
two stages mechanisms that combines two instruments : a tradable permits
market and an ambient tax. The tax acts as a threat that will be applied in
case of non-compliance to a pre-determined ambient pollution standard.
The market then makes it possible to effectively distribute the abatement
level between the agents through the quantity of permits and the price.
Segerson and Wu [6] also designed a mechanism combining two instru-
mentsto manage nonpointsourcepollution: a voluntary-based instrument
associated to a tax if the standard is exceeded. However, the threat pro-
posed by these authors rests on an investment which makes it possible to
9measure individual emissions and thus design individual tax rates. Such
an investment can prove very expensive.
We adopted another approach which rests on an initial high tax. Although
this type of tax is not optimal, it makes it possible to guarantee compliance
to the ambient pollution standard. Furthermore, the correct operation of a
permit market leads to a permit price equal to the marginal abatement cost.
At the second stage of the mechanism, it is the equilibrium price which will
be taken as the tax rate in the event of non-compliance with the standard.
However, as the permit price is equal to the marginal abatement cost, no
agent will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to free-ride. Contrary to the mechanism devel-
oped by Segerson and Wu [6], instead of investing to measure the individ-
ual emissions, we leave the market reveal it.
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